Creative Benefits of Keeping a Diary

About the benefits of keeping a diary for those who write...

Keeping a Diary

Platonic Paradigm and Parallel Universes

Revisiting Plato's Theory of Forms and "One Over Many" doctrine from a physicist's perspective...

What is there are parallell universes? What if Plato is right?

Parallel Universes

Is there a satisfactory alternative to epistemological skepticism?

Skeptical arguments challenge even the very solid pieces of our knowledge. Take, for example, your belief that you have hands. You see your hands, you hold and move things with them. So, what can possibly threaten your knowledge or true belief that you have hands?

In this essay, I shall argue three responses to skepticism based on the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) hypothesis and conclude that despite their validity and plausibility, they fall behind skepticism to constitute as satisfactory alternatives.

The skeptical argument can be constructed as follows[1]:

(1)   I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.

(2)   If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.

(3)   I don’t know that I have hands.

This argument is indeed a valid argument in the sense that (1) and (2) are plausible premises and (3) logically follows from these premises. Regardless of how farfetched or against commonsense may it seem to assume that you are a brain-in-a-vat, you still don’t know you are not one. And this very fact is what underlies the strength of skeptic’s argument: It is straightforward and its premises are difficult to rule out or there is a possibility that they are true or at the very least we don’t know that they are false. Hence, any argument developed against skepticism must question the soundness of the argument.

In response to BIV argument, G. E. Moore states that the conclusion of BIV argument is less plausible than its premises and thus reconstructs the BIV argument (counter-BIV argument) by asserting the opposite of the skeptic’s conclusion[2]:

(1)   I know that I have hands.

(2)   If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.

(3)   I know that I’m not a BIV.

What Moore suggests is that in the face of two conflicting premises, we should opt for the common-sense premise that we know we have hands, which entails the conclusion that we know we are not BIVs.

Though Moorean argument is valid, it is still not a satisfactory alternative to skepticism. First, it does not explain how Moore knows that he has hands. The skeptic who asserts that he doesn’t know whether there is an external world might easily claim that he does not know that he has hands. He might as well be dreaming that he has hands. Second, the premises of Moorean argument remain insufficient in convincing the skeptic who would not agree with its conclusion. And finally, the skeptic might allege that Moorean premises lack proof in order to constitute as ‘knowledge’.

Another response to skepticism is argued by “Relevant Alternatives” theory, which basically says that “the main ingredient that must be added to true belief to make knowledge is that one be in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives to what one believes” (DeRose, 1999, p. 14). What underlies the BIV argument is that since we cannot discriminate between our actually having hands and not being a BIV, we don’t know that we have hands. According to the relevant alternative theorist, this discrimination is not relevant anymore because our being a BIV is not a relevant alternative to our having hands. Thus, we can deduce that we know we have hands.

Accordingly, the BIV argument can be constructed as follows[3]:

(1)   You know you have hands.

(2)   You know that your having hands entails your not being a BIV.

(3)   You don’t know that you are not a BIV.

This argument rejects the second premise of BIV argument and asserts that you know you have hands though you don’t know you are not a BIV. This, in turn, implies that this theory denies the “Closure Principle”, which basically says that if S knows p, and p entails q; then S knows q. Hence, the main concern that can be raised by a skeptic against relevant alternatives theory is its denial of this intuitively appealing principle. Another important problem for this approach is the lack of a principled basis for what constitutes relevant and irrelevant alternatives.

The contextualist response to BIV argument deploys a different approach and focuses on the use of the word “know” in differing contexts. The utterance of “I know” can be ascribed freely to knowledge in low-standard settings, but cannot be done so liberally in high-standard settings. One can ask what the point is epistemologically in distinguishing between high and low-standard settings? The point is that the skeptical argument creates such a context that we count no more as “knowers” even when we utter such a straightforward sentence as “I know I have hands”. The skeptic’s demanding high standards raise questions such as “how do I know my having hands?”, “How do I know that I’m not a BIV who has the same sensory experiences as a human-being?” On the other hand, in a non-philosophical sense, I ordinarily do know that I have hands and cannot be deemed false in claiming so. Since contextualism employs two types of contexts, it resolves this seemingly paradox and truth-condition holds in both settings.

Thus, contextualism is a plausible argument and preserves the “Closure Principle”, which holds in both high and low-standard settings:

a.      If the meaning of “know” is set by low standards, I know that I have hands and I know that I’m not a BIV.

b.     If the meaning of “know” is set by high standards, I don’t know that I have hands and I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.

The main criticism against contextualism is that since high-standard settings allow the use of skeptic’s argument asserting “I don’t know”, it makes considerable concessions to skepticism. Another objection is that people are not strictly context-sensitive, which implies that the way they use the word “know” is not determined at all times. Besides, the way contextualism assumes strict context-sensitivity ignores people’s intention when they utter the word “know”.

In summary, skeptical argument seems to enjoy a higher degree of plausibility and soundness in comparison to responses raised against it. The strength of the argument mainly stems from the fact that the skeptical hypothesis is such that “…we cannot rule out her hypothesis, that it’s possible that her hypothesis is true, or that we don’t know that her hypothesis is false.” (DeRose, 1999, p. 2)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DeRose, Keith (1999), ‘Responding to Skepticism’, Oxford University Press.

Steap, Matthias (2005), ‘Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, accessed June 30, 2014.

Speaks, Jeff (2004), ‘Moore’s Response to Skepticism’, http://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/370/Moore-skepticism.pdf, accessed June 30, 2014.

DeRose, Keith (1999), ‘Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense’, http://fitelson.org/epistemology/derose.pdf, accessed July 4, 2014.

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[1] Steap, Matthias (2005), ‘Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, accessed June 25, 2014

[2] Steap, Matthias (2005), ‘Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, accessed June 25, 2014

 [3] Steap, Matthias (2005), ‘Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, accessed June 25, 2014

Socratic Irony and Neuroscience

"The philosopher Socrates lived from 469 to 399 B.C. Although he is one of history’s most famous philosophers—arguably the most famous—he never wrote a word, unless we count a poem that he wrote in prison in Athens while awaiting execution. Why, you ask, was someone so important put to death? We know a great deal about the events leading up to his execution, mainly from an amazing document that survives, called the Apology. It was written by Plato and purports to be a recounting of what Socrates said in his defense at his trial. But, trial for what you ask, what was he charged with? The official charge was impiety, which to the Athenians at that time meant roughly that he was not a good citizen. That charge consisted of three counts: First, Socrates was charged with not worshipping the gods of Athens, second, he was charged with creating new gods, and third, he was charged with corrupting the youth. The last charge came about because many young men would follow Socrates around as he questioned the leading citizens of Athens, or anyone who claimed to have knowledge. The records of these interactions are part of what are known as the platonic dialogues, marvelous works of literature produced by his student Plato that depict what Socratic questioning was like. In them, Socrates shows via questioning that the person he is talking with who is claiming to have knowledge really doesn’t possess it, since he contradicts himself, or is simply unable to answer Socrates’ questions adequately..."

Follow the link below to read the rest of the article...

Socratic Irony and Neuroscience

Excerpt from The Phantoms in the Brain

“…Consider next the simple act of smiling, something we all do every day in social situations. You see a good friend and you grin. But what happens when that friend aims a camera at your face and asks you to smile on command? Instead of a natural expression, you produce a hideous grimace. Paradoxically, an act that you perform effortlessly dozens of times each day becomes extraordinarily difficult to perform when someone simply asks you to do it. You might think it’s because if you walk over to any mirror and try smiling, I assure you that the same grimace will appear.

The reason these two kinds of smiles differ is that different brain regions handle them, and only one of them contains a specialized “smile circuit.” A spontaneous smile is produced by the basal ganglia, clusters of cells found between the brain’s higher cortex (where thinking and planning take place) and the evolutionary older thalamus. When you encounter a friendly face, the visual message from that face eventually reaches the brain’s emotional center or limbic system and is subsequently relayed to the basal ganglia, which orchestrate the sequences of facial muscle activity needed for producing a natural smile. When this circuit is activated, your smile is genuine. The entire cascade of events, once set in motion, happens in a fraction of a second without the thinking parts of your cortex ever being involved…”

                                                                                          Phantoms in the Brain, p. 13

This is your brain on writing

"........
The researchers, led by Martin Lotze of the University of Greifswald in Germany, observed a broad network of regions in the brain working together as people produced their stories. But there were notable differences between the two groups of subjects. The inner workings of the professionally trained writers in the bunch, the scientists argue, showed some similarities to people who are skilled at other complex actions, like music or sports....."

Follow the link for the rest of the article:

Your brain on writing

Freedom and resentment

“Freedom and resentment” is one critical essay of Strawson, which was originally delivered as a lecture to the British Academy and then published in Proceedings of the British Academy (1962).

Here he is...

Being a philosophy student of Oxford’s Continuing Education Programme, recently have we been asked to read this paper of Strawson. That’s how I came up with it.

In his paper, overall, Strawson argues the role and implications of determinism (assuming the possible truth of determinism) for agents susceptible of moral assessment. His main argument is that "pessimism" and "optimism" about the compatibility of determinism and morality needn't be mutually exclusive, that is to say, they can somehow be reconciled.

But how come? His argument about the compatibility of determinism and morality is further strengthened by his differentiation of attitudes as:
1. Reactive attitudes (such as resentment and gratitude)
2. Moral reactive attitudes
3. Self reactive attitudes

The key question in his essay is that if we assume determinism to hold true, would we have to assess everybody with an "objective attitude"?

According to Strawson "No!" because first of all, being a human renders reactive attitudes natural even under the case in which the agents are deemed to be free from responsibility (answerability, accountability) due to various reasons.

Likewise, in arguing moral attitudes, Strawson claims that believing determinism to be true does not necessarily lead us to "abandon moral dispprobation of agents."

In summary, he arrives at the general conclusion that the reasons of the fact that in some circumstances we need to suspend our moral reactive attitudes toward some agent doesn't entail the truth of determinism. Furthermore, rationality is not disputable for issues related to the very nature of human being such as having reactive attitudes.

What are you?

In his second meditation, after seeking the truth that leaves no room for doubt, Descartes finally becomes sure about something: “He is, he exists.”

The famous quote of him does not come yet in its complete form. But he basically says “I am, I exist’, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.” He is pretty close though…

Even the existence of a malicious demon who tries to deceive him all the time cannot deceive him about the very fact that he thinks. As long as he is busy thinking about whether he is imagining in his sleep or not, whether his senses sometimes deceive him or not he exists.

But what entails this “thinking”? What does he mean by thinking, the endeavour of his soul?

The attributes, according to Descartes that make him a thinking thing are doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, being willing or unwilling, imagining and having sensory perceptions.

What do you think? Do you think this list is fair enough? If not, what are some of the attributes you assign to thinking?

What the bleep do we know?

Long time ago, I had watched the movie named "What the bleep do we know?"

It was actually a documentary type movie about how the quantum physics changed the way we perceive and interpret the seemingly real world we live in.

Now as I am reading Descartes' meditations, I cannot avoid, but think that modern philosophers do not apreciate as much Descartes' starting point by questioning the existence of anything as they should in the light of quantum theory's recent findings. 

Anyway, as Simon Blackburn says:

"Perhaps the most unsettling thought many of us have, often quite early on in childhood, is that the whole world might be a dream; that the ordinary scenes and objects of everyday life might be fantasies. The reality we live in may be a virtual reality, spun out of our own minds, or perhaps injected into our minds by some sinister Other. Of course, such thought come, and then go. Most of us shake them off. But why are we right to do so? How can we know that the world as we take it to be, is the world as it is? How do we begin to think about the relation between appearance and reality: things as we take them to be, as opposed to things as they are?" (Think, pp. 15, Simon Blackburn)

The Value of Philosophy

"......But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices of what are wrongly called 'practical' men. The 'practical' man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.   

....

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect...."   

From Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy